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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VIII MAY, 1934 NUMBER 2
THE PROPOSED CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND
PRACTICE RULES-A COMMENT
p RESIDING Justice Edward R. Finch of the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, has for many years devoted
himself to improving the administration of justice in New
York. His credo comprehends a simplified procedure, a
short civil practice act and a restoration to the courts of the
rule-making power. At his suggestion, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, through its Committee on
Court Rules, recently undertook the project implicit in these
articles of faith. Through his instrumentality, and for this
purpose, the Carnegie Corporation of New York placed at
the disposal of the Committee a fund of $10,000. Philip
Halpern, Professor of Law at Buffalo University, Werner
Ilsen, Professor of Law at St. John's University School of
Law, and Theodore Richter, a member of the Committee,
were retained to assist. The Committee prepared an act
containing a CIVIL PRACTICE LAW and PRACTICE RULES, and
submitted it to the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, in the form of a SPECIAL REPORT, together with a
letter of transmittal requesting support in the State Legis-
lature. Pending the introduction of the act, Presiding Jus-
tice Finch graciously made formal request for suggestions
or criticism thereof. In response, I offer this comment.
THE EXISTING CIVIL PRACTICE ACT AND PRACTICE RULES
Our present Civil Practice Act and the Rules of Civil
Practice (adopted by convention) became operative on Oc-
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tober 1, 1921. The former now contains about 1,630 sections;
the latter contain 236 Rules.1
"Except as otherwise expressly provided," the Civil
Practice Act applies "to the civil practice in all the courts
of record of the State." 2 The Rules "are binding upon all
the courts in this state and all the justices and judges
thereof, except the court for the trial of impeachments and
the court of appeals." I Auxiliary to these, we have the New
York City Court Act, the Surrogate's Court Act, the Court
of Claims Act and the Justice Court Act.
The Civil Practice Act and the Rules superseded the
Code of Civil Procedure (the Troop Code) of 1877. The
Code of Civil Procedure had previously superseded the first
Code of Procedure (the Field Code) of 1848.
The Civil Practice Act is subject to legislative amend-.
ment. Since 1924, the Rules of Civil Practice have been
subject to amendment by a majority of the justices of the
appellate division in the four departments. 4
TE PROPOSED CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND PRACTICE RULES
The sponsors of the proposed act desire to reduce sub-
stantially the legislative regulations now contained in the
Practice Act and remove them to the Rules. We have already
noted that there are about 1,630 sections in the present
Practice Act and that there are about 236 Rules. In the
proposed Civil Practice Law, there are 753 sections, and
there are about 1,184 Rules.5  By the process of removal, the
' Special Report of the Committee on Court Rules of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York on the Extension of the Rule-making
Power, at III.
2 N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) §1.
In re Wills, 162 App. Div. 775, 147 N. Y. Supp. 930 (2d Dept. 1914).
'N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW (1924) §82. The complete text of the statute is
as follows: "Rules of practice. A majority of the justices of the appellate
division in the four departments, by joint order of the four presiding justices
or justices presiding, shall have the power, from time to time, to adopt, amend
or rescind any rule of civil practice, not inconsistent with any statute; and a
majority of the justices of the appellate division in each department, by order
of such majority, shall have power, from time to time, to adopt, amend or
rescind any special rule for such department not inconsistent with any statute
or rule of civil practice." (As amended by L. 1924, c. 172.)
SSupra note 1.
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number of sections is reduced by approximately 877 sections,
but by that very process, the number of Rules is increased
by 948. The result is a net increase of 71 in the number of
enumerated provisions. 6
The two existing methods of amendment-legislative
and judicial-are retained, but the enlargement of the Rules
operates to substantially increase the scope of judicial
amendment.8
Statement of Principles Underlying Plan
One wishes that there had been a clearer enunciation of
the principles that governed the preparation of the proposed
act. The following principles are, however, discernible:
"The plan of the Act is first: to enact as the Civil Practice
Law all substantive law and structural provisions which are
now found in the Civil Practice Act and such enabling sec-
tions as are appropriate to assure the power of the rule-
making body to deal with the subjects committed to the
rules; second: to provide that the present Civil Practice
Rules and the sections transferred from the Civil Practice
Act shall henceforth have force and effect only as rules of
court subject to amendment, etc. by the body charged with
making court rules." 9 Sections contained in the existing
"The Committee explains the increase as follows: "The increase in the
total number of statutory provisions and rules is largely due to the fact that
many sections of the Civil Practice Act were split and the substantive matter
retained in the statute and the procedural matter transferred to the rules." Ibid.
" The introductory clause to the proposed Practice rules is as follows:
"The following provisions shall, from and after the effective date of this act,
have force and effect, as and only as, rules of court and shall be known as the
practice rules and may be amended, added to, suspended, abrogated or rescinded,
in whole or in part, in the manner provided in section eighty-two of the
judiciary law." Id. at 272.
Except where otherwise stated, italics used in this comment are mine.
For text of §82 of N. Y. Judiciary Law, see supra note 4.
8 It is interesting to note the following proposed rule of construction:
"Inconsistency between statute and rule not to be found. Whenever a question
oT inconsistency between a statutory provision and a rule arises, the statutory
provision shall be construed, in so far as its language may permit, so as to
avoid inconsistency and to sustain the validity of the rule." CIVIL PaMcnca
LAw §747, supra note 1, at 270.
"Id. at III. The language quoted is stated by the Committee to be an
adaptation of that used in the Wisconsin Act (L. 1929, c. 404).
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Civil Practice Act that cannot be regarded as jurisdictional,
structural or substantive have been transferred to the
Rules. 10 The Committee does not "favor going to the verge
of constitutional power in transferring from statute to rule
every procedural provision, no matter how fundamental. The
Committee has proceeded upon the theory that a practice act
is something more than a declaration of general liberal prin-
ciples and that it should contain the outline of the procedure
so long as it does not restrict the freedom of the rule-making
power to simplify and expedite practice." 11 Substantive law
provisions are kept in the Practice Law, for "the Committee
can see no advantage to be gained from taking the substan-
tive law out of the Civil Practice Act and placing it in con-
solidated laws, now existing or hereafter to be created,
although substantive law would in strict theory be more
appropriately found there. It does not interfere with pro-
cedure in the slightest to have substantive law in the prac-
tice law and the Committee has become convinced that the
profession does not welcome the idea of taking the substan-
tive law out of it. * * * The Committee's recommended act,
therefore, leaves the substantive law where it was. * * * 12
"No change in the practice is proposed." 13
By application of these principles, all substantire provi-
sions, all jurisdictional provisions and all structural or fun-
damental provisions are retained in the proposed Civil Prac-
tice Law. All else is transferred to the Rules. Substan-
tially, nothing is eliminated nor is any change in practice
effected. Reference to the text will illustrate the applica-
tion of these principles.
Illusrations of Application of Underlying Principles
The provision now contained in §8 of the Civil l'.
tice Act, merginig equity and law actions, remains a statu
tory provision because it is structural or fundamental."
10 Id. at 786 (Introductory note to mandamus proceeding).
11 Id. at III.
I bid.
13 Id. at I.
1 Id. at 685. "The abolition of the distinction between law and equity is
kept in the law as an organic provision."
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND PRACTICE RULES 237
Almost all of the provisions on limitations of time (Statute
of Limitations) remain statutory as part of substantive law;
but the provisions contained in §30 of the Civil Practice
Act, governing the manner of taking objections that the
action was not commenced within the time limited, are trans-
ferred to the Rules because they are purely procedural. 15
The provisions as to jurisdiction and powers of courts, judges
and referees are retained in the Law. 1 6 Civil Practice Act
§211-a creating a right of contribution where a judgment
has been recovered against joint tort-feasors, retains its place
in the Law because it is substantive.17 Civil Practice Act
§§1S2-188 governing the rules of venue are transferred to
the Rules because they are procedural; but Civil Practice
Act §§189 and 190 authorizing transfers of trials from one
court to another, retain their place in the Law because they
are jurisdictional.18  Civil Practice Act §254 providing that
"the first pleading, on the part of the plaintiff is the com-
plaint," is retained in the Law "as part of the structure to
which other procedural provisions may be attached." 19 Like
treatment is given to Civil Practice Act §260 which provides
that "The only pleading, on the part of the defendant, is the
answer." 20 Sections on the forms of pleadings and their
effect, amended and supplemental pleadings, bill of particu-
lars and verification are transferred to the Rules, because
they are procedural.2 ' Civil Practice Act §23-a, providing
that, in specified cases, an action for negligence for a mari-
time tort may be brought within one year after May 1, 1923,
is one of the few provisions eliminated because of obso-
lescence. Changes are not made even in the face of actual
or apparent inconsistencies. 22
Id. at 686.
Id.at 687.
17Id. at 700.
18 Id. at 698.
" Id. at 703.
' Id. at 704.
Id. at 703.
SId. at 692 (notes to §§115-118) and at 746 (notes to §§897-901).
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THE PROBLEM
Whether it is desirable that the Legislature pass the
proposed act is determinable only after a satisfactory solu-
tion of two questions:
1. Is the instant revision sound?
2. Is the principle of judicial rule-making by a major-
ity of the justices of the appellate division in the four depart-
ments, adopted as the basis of the proposed act, sound?
The first question relating to the soundness of the in-
stant revision requires consideration of the- validity of the
underlying principles and their application. With one sig-
nificant exception, it may be conceded that the principles are
sound, and, on the whole, well applied. I doubt, however,
the soundness of any revision, the major premise of which is
to make no change in the practice. No revision worth the
name should be confined by any such strait-jacket principle.
The second question relating to judicial rule-making is,
in my judgment, more significant and it is primarily this
phase of the problem upon which I desire to make comment.
JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE RULE-MAKING.
Too much dogmatism has been uttered by judicial rule-
making enthusiasts. Judicial procedure is not inherently
good and wise.23  A movement whose prime motive is to
shorten the Practice Act and enlarge the Rules must probe
the problem of who is most competent to be the rule-making
authority. The Committee on Court Rules of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York advises us that the
proposed act is designed "to afford to the judiciary, rather
than to the legislature, the duty and opportunity to improve
'Mr. Herbert Harley, Secretary of the American Judicature Society,
speaking of judicial rule-making, recently said: "There has been too much
dogmatism on behalf of this movement. Its proponents have generally taken
the position that legislative procedure is inherently evil and that reform would
inevitably follow a restoration of this power to the Supreme Court." Herbert
Harley, The Argument for' Judicial Rule-Making, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. ScIENCE 93.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND PRACTICE RULES 239
procedure. * * * The Committee favors the principle of leav-
ing to the courts the prescribing of court procedure. * * * It
is submitted that the adoption of the act will give to the
judiciary the opportunity and duty to simplify and expedite
civil practice and that the judical regulation of practice is
as natural a function as the legislative regulation of legis-
lative practice, while the legislative regulation of practice
in the courts is as unnatural as would be the judicial regu-
lation of practice in the legislature." 24
Let us briefly state the case (1) in favor of judicial rule-
making, and (2) in favor of legislative rule-making.
Case in Favor of Judicial Rule-Making
1. Prior to the adoption of the Field Code in 1848, pro-
cedural rules were evolved by the courts as part of the com-
mon law. It was only when the courts failed in their task of
adapting procedural law to changing needs that recourse was
had to the legislature. The change back to judicial rule-
making would therefore not be a radical innovation. It
would be substantially a return to earlier practice. This is
the historical argument in favor of judicial rule-making.
2. If the courts are to be held responsible for the admin-
istration of justice, they ought to be allowed to fix their own
procedure. The administrator is most competent to judge
his needs, and to detect, localize and remedy defects in the
system. Responsibility without power is neither just to the
administrator nor advantageous to the public.
3. The doctrine of separation of powers under our con-
stitutional form of government should preclude the legisla-
tive branch from regulating the procedure of the judicial
branch, quite as much as the judicial branch is precluded
from regulating the procedure of the legislative branch.
4. Legislative rule-making for the courts is inconsis-
tent with the policy pursued by the legislatures upon the
" Supra note 1, at I, IV.
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creation of administrative tribunals-such as the Public Ser-
vice Commission, the State Transit Commission, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,
Customs Courts-some of them exercising only quasi-judicial
powers. These tribunals are unrestricted respecting their
procedure, though many of their members have had no legal
training. And the concensus of opinion is that administra-
tive tribunals have functioned well.
5. Rule-making for the courts should be the work of
technicians. Legislative rule-making is haphazard and inex-
pert. Members of the legislature are not elected to office
because of ability for rule-making.
These, and more, are the arguments urged in favor of
judicial rule-making.
But what say the protagonists of legislative rule-
making?
Case in Favor of Legislative Rule-Making
1. To return to the old system of permitting the courts
to establish rules for themselves is, to employ the language
of a seasoned legislator, "a step backward." 25 Return to
judicial rule-making is not a mark of progress; it is a sign
of retrogression.
2. Because of the popular election of members of the
legislature at frequent intervals, legislative rule-making is
more expressive of the will of the people.
3. Judicial rule-making, under the provisions of §82 of
the Judiciary Law, by a majority of the justices3 of the
appellate division in the four departments, does not at pres-
ent operate satisfactorily. "Where the rules are modified as
under §82 of the Judiciary Law, by the round-robin method,
from one Appellate Division to another, there is no oppor-
tuntiy for the people to be heard, or even for the bar to
Burton T. Esmond, "Rule-Alaking by the Legislature, 167 ANNALS Am.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCIENCE 102.
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present their views." 26 The legislature contrariwise func-
tions through committees who hold hearings and give ample
notice. The legislature meets at. definite periods of the year,
and changes in the rules are effected during these sessions
and no other. Moreover, legislative enactments, except in
extraordinary cases, are made to take effect on September
1st. Often, substantive law is not severable from procedural
law, and the power to amend both must be in a single body.
The emergency rent laws of New York contained a legisla-
tive declaration of the existence of an emergency and regu-
lated the procedure in the courts respecting actions for rent
and dispossess proceedings. A declaration by the courts of
the existence of an emergency would have been beyond the
province of the courts. 27
An Appraisal
A fair consideration and appraisal of these conflicting
contentions necessitates a quest for an alternative rule-
making authority. Neither the legislative nor the judicial
method is altogether satisfactory.
Rule-making for the courts should not be the task of
the legislature. This is my conclusion, though I feel that
the Legislature of New York has assiduously performed the
task assigned to it. We should never forget that through
the legislature, a modern system of procedure was evolved
in the face of the voluntary default and abdication by the
courts. This is the genesis of the Field Code.
Rule-making is not primarily the task of the legislature
because it demands the competency of the technician.
Nor do I believe that the historical argument, offered in
support of judicial rule-making, is deserving of much con-
sideration. History also shows that the courts failed in their
assigned task.
" Esmond, supra note 25, at 103.
-The arguments in favor of and in opposition to judicial rule-making
have been restated recently in the articles referred to in Annals, supra notes
23 and 25. The volumes of the Journal of American Judicature Society should
also be consulted on this subject.
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Little significance, too, is to be attached to the all but
obsolete political doctrine of separation of powers.
Is rule-making by a majority of the justices of the
appellate divisions in the four departments, pursuant to §82
of the Judiciary Law, the best solution? I answer in the
negative.
The rule-making process demands the ability not only
of members of the appellate courts. Trial judges constantly,
and, at first hand, deal with procedural problems. They
should be, and are, eminently competent to participate in
the process of rule-making. Nor should we omit to imple-
ment the ability of other officers of the court--the lawyers.
Are they not qualified for the task? Who more than they?
Our experience with judicial rule-making, pursuant to
§82 of the Judiciary Law, does not warrant its extension.
Excepting the recent significant amendments to Rule 113
affecting motions for summary judgment and a few other,
comparatively minor, amendments, very little has been done
by the rule-making authority under its existing powers. Nor
should the current practice of rule-making without notice,
hearing and full discussion pass without criticism. It is
indefensible.
The rule-making authority should be a Judicial Council
-a mixed tribunal composed of judges, lawyers, members
of law faculties and laymen-equipped with ability and
power adequate to the high task and full opportunities for
its realization.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Act should not be passed by the Legis-
lature.
A Commission on Revision of the Civil Practice Act
should be appointed to consider the extent and manner of
revision of our existing civil practice and the feasibility of
creating a Judicial Council.
January 15, 1934.
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Because of the timeliness of the subject treated in the
foregoing comment, it was deemed advisable to release the
same for publication in advance of its appearance here. Ac-
cordingly, on February 1, 1934, copies thereof were made
available to attorneys practicing in New York State. At
about the time of release, the Commission on the Administra-
tion of Justice in New York State issued its report,28 dated
January 25, 1934, and, among other things, recommended
the establishment of a Judicial Council and the creation of
a Law Revision Commission.
Since the submission of said report, and very largely
because of it, an act creating and establishing the Judicial
Council of the State of New York has become law.29 The
powers of the Judicial Council as defined in the Act are
largely advisory. It has no rule-making power except with
respect to the manner of keeping records of the business of
any court.30
'N. Y. LEGISLATivE DOCUMENT (1934) No. 50.
' N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 128. For criticism of Act, see p. 5, et seq., Report
by Joint Committee of New York City Bar Associations with respect to
report of the New York State Commission on the Administration of Justice
(March 15, 1934).
'The powers and duties of the Judicial Council are thus defined: "Sec.
45. Powers and duties. The council shall have the powers and shall be
charged with the following duties:
(a) To make a continuous survey and study of the organization, juris-
diction, procedure, practice, rules and methods of administration and operation
of each and all the courts of the state, including both courts of record and
courts not of record, the volume and condition of business in said courts, the
work accomplished and the results obtained.
(b) To collect, compile, analyze and publish the judicial statistics of
the state in compliance with article six, section twenty-two of the constitution.
(c) To receive, consider and in its discretion investigate criticisms and
suggestions from any source pertaining to the administration of justice and to
make recommendations in reference thereto.
(d) To keep advised concerning the decisions of the courts relating to
the procedure and practice therein and concerning pending legislation affecting
the organization, jurisdiction, operation, procedure and practice of the courts.
(e) To recommend from time to time to the legislature any changes in
the organization, jurisdiction, operation, procedure and methods of conducting
the business in the courts which can be put into effect only by legislative action
and to recommend to any court or to any body vested with the rule-making
power for any court any changes in the rules and practice of said courts or
the methods of administering judicial business therein which, in the judgment
of the council, would simplify and expedite or otherwise improve the admin-
istration of justice therein.
(f) To adopt and from time to time amend and promulgate with the
force and effect of law rules and regulations not inconsistent with any statute
with respect to the manner of keeping records of the business of any court."
N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 128.
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The second recommendation of the Commission on the
Administration of Justice for the establishment of a Law
Revision Commission (to consist of five members, of whom
two shall be members of the faculties of law schools within
the state of New York) is, at present writing, pending before
the legislature of New York with all indications pointing to
its enactment. The proposed Law Revision Commission is
not to consider matters of administration of law since this
falls within the scope of the Judicial Council.3'
Information presently at hand indicates that the pro-
posed Civil Practice Law and Practice Rules will be submit-
ted for consideration to the Law Revision Commission when
appointed by the Governor. I expect that, in that event, the
Law Revision Commission will consider the feasibility of
amending section 82 of the Judiciary Law as well as the Act
creating the Judicial Council, to the end that the rule-making
power may be vested in the latter body.
April 16, 1934.
Louis PRASHKER.
St. John's University School of Law.
'The purposes of the Law Revision Commission as set forth in the
pending act prepared by the Commission on the Administration of Justice are
as follows:
"1. To examine the common law and statutes of the state and judicial
decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law
and recommending needed reforms;
"2. To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended
by the American Law Institute, the commissioners for the promotion of uni-
formity of legislation in the United States, any bar association or other
learned bodies;
"3. To receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, public offi-
cials, lawyers and the public generally as to defects and anachronisms in
the law;
"4. To recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it
deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law,
and to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with
modern conditions;
"5. To report its proceedings annually to the legislature on or before
February first, and, if it deems advisable, to accompany its report with pro-
posed bills to carry out any of its recommendations." Supra note 28, at 55.
